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LEGISLATION
About the time when the FCC issued its "Digital
Tornado" paper, Europe was debating its "Con-
vergence Green Paper." What emerged five years
later in Europe were six new directives that cre-
ated a comprehensive regulatory framework de-
signed to deal with convergence.
What's a directive?
As a preliminary matter, it is important for
readers to understand that the European direc-
tives are not like U.S. federal laws. As their name
suggests, directives are binding instructions to
Member States to enact national legislation that
has certain characteristics and achieves a certain
outcome. Directives can be compared to a cook-
ing recipe. Some directives leave freedom to
Member States, specifying only the end result that
should be achieved (e.g. the end result should be
a "chocolate cake"). Other directives are so de-
tailed that they provide the precise ingredients
and cooking time, leaving virtually no room for
national lawmakers to improvise. Most aspects of
the new European communications directives fall
into the latter category. They are detailed and
leave little room for interpretation. This is hard
for national lawmakers to accept, since it is their
job to debate policy and enact national legislation
in light of national circumstances; hence, the ten-
dency for some national parliaments to take liber-
ties with the directives' plain language.
Currently, the French and German parliaments
are debating national legislation designed to "im-
plement" the new package of EU directives. The
directives were supposed to be implemented by
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July 24, 2003. The UK and a number of Scandina-
vian countries were right on time. France and
Germany are late. Moreover, France and Ger-
many are tinkering with the directives' language
under pressure from various interest groups. So,
we will end up in Europe with a series of late
adopters, and some national legislation will be
only partially compliant with the directives' lan-
guage. This could lead to inconsistent regulatory
regimes in Europe, with frustrated companies
who don't understand why a seemingly clear term
of a directive ends up getting muddled.
What do the new directives say?
The terms of the directives are summarized in
the annex to this article. Put simply, the new di-
rectives abolish all regulatory distinctions between
cable networks, telephone networks, and the In-
ternet. All networks are now called "electronic
communications networks." Services are called
"electronic communications services." Europe no
longer uses the term "telecommunications."
After putting all services and networks into a
single, all-encompassing, regulatory category
called "electronic communications," the new di-
rectives attempt to create a light-handed and flexi-
ble set of rules that will regulate these networks
and services only to the extent necessary, paving
the way toward the day when ex ante regulation
can disappear altogether, to be replaced only by
competition law. The glide path toward competi-
tion law is already written into the directives.
In theory, this all sounds good. In practice,
crafting "light handed and flexible" rules and
remedies in the communications field is not easy.
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE NEw EU FRAMEWORK,
(Winston Maxwell, ed., 2003). This outline contains excerpts
from the book.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Access remedies under the new framework
The main subject of this article is the various
access remedies that can be applied to broadband
networks and services under the EU framework.
There are a number of similarities between how
access remedies for broadband will operate in the
U.S. under the Triennial Review Order, and how
they will function in Europe under the new frame-
work. When I speak of access remedies, I mean
the circumstances under which a new entrant can
have access to the infrastructure and services of
another operator, often the incumbent.
The first similarity between the US and Euro-
pean approach to access remedies is a broad defi-
nition of network elements. Under the new Euro-
pean framework, practically anything can be a
"network or associated facility" to which competi-
tors can gain access in certain circumstances.
This is similar to the U.S. concept of Unbundled
Network Elements ("UNE"): practically anything
can be included in the concept of UNE.
The European concept goes even farther than
the U.S. notion of UNE, since the European re-
gime covers cable networks, wireless networks, sat-
ellite networks, the Internet, and even power lines
if they are used to transmit data. The U.S. con-
cept of UNE is limited, I believe, to the incum-
bent's traditional telephone network.
The second similarity is that the new European
framework uses a balancing approach not unlike
the approach used in the FCC's Triennial Review
Order. The balancing in Europe is done by each
national regulator when crafting appropriate ac-
cess remedies. Each regulator must promote the
key objectives listed in Article 8 of the Framework
Directive (there are 19 objectives, the key ones be-
ing: "promote competition", "develop the internal
European market", "promote the interests of EU
citizens"). European regulators must also take
into account the need to promote innovation and
protect investment in new infrastructure. Regula-
tors also need to look at the replicability of the
existing infrastructure, barriers to entry (an analy-
sis resembling a watered-down essential facilities
doctrine), and the risk taken by the incumbent
when investing in new infrastructure. This resem-
bles the balancing exercise described in the Tri-
ennial Review Order.
Greenfield infrastructure
In its recent guidelines on remedies, the Euro-
pean Regulators Group ("ERG") distinguished be-
tween "greenfield" new infrastructure, for which
access remedies should not apply, and legacy in-
frastructure, for which access remedies would be
appropriate in many cases. This is consistent with
the Triennial Review Order, where the FCC held
that FTTH, or new generation networks built by
the incumbent, should not be burdened by access
remedies. In both cases, regulators try to find the
right balance between easing access-based market
entry for competitors and the need to encourage
infrastructure investment by the incumbent.
Those are some similarities between the US and
European approach; now for the differences.
Separate market analysis (and remedies) in each
country
In Europe, the balancing methodology has to
be applied by each national regulator separately,
albeit in consultation with the European Commis-
sion. This leads to a risk of inconsistent results.
Each regulator must, on its own, apply a three-
step approach:
* First, define the relevant market (product
and service; geographic market, using the
Commission's Recommendation on relevant
markets; and Guidelines);
" Second, identify SMP (dominant) players on
the market using the Commission's Guide-
lines;
* Third, develop "appropriate" remedies using
the balancing test.
At each step of the way, the national regulator
must communicate its findings to the European
Commission and to other national regulators, and
consult with interested parties. While the Euro-
pean Commission has some influence over deci-
sions of national regulators, there is no guarantee
of uniformity in the national decisions. For a
given service (a mobile messaging service, for ex-
ample), there could in theory be as many differ-
ent access regimes as there are Member States.
This is certainly not what is intended under the
new framework, since regulators are supposed to
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harmonize their approaches to those questions.
But it is a possible outcome.
The FCC, on the other hand, has identified cer-
tain network elements in the Triennial Review
that must be made available to competitors,
thereby preempting State decisions on those ele-
ments. This may create greater uniformity than
in Europe, at least for those elements. For other
markets or network elements, the FCC defers to
the States to do the balancing based on local mar-
ket conditions. This latter approach resembles
the European framework, with a risk of inconsis-
tent results emerging in different jurisdictions.
The biggest fear of the creators of the new
framework is that Member States and national
regulators will take the principles of the new di-
rectives and reach different results. There is a
great deal of benchmarking and transparency
built into the new framework, via the creation of a
Communications Committee, a European Regula-
tor's Group, and the obligation to consult with
the Commission and other national regulators.
But there is still a real risk of inconsistent results.
If the new directives cause Vodafone to be regu-
lated differently in each Member State where it
does business, the new framework will have been
a failure, since creating a uniform internal market
is one of the key objectives of the whole package.
Extending "telecom" remedies to new areas
(cable, Internet, mobile)
The biggest difference between the U.S. and
Europe is no doubt Europe's "converged" ap-
proach to regulation, which contrasts with the US
framework, which is still based on legacy distinc-
tions. Europe acted on the convergence concept,
tearing up its old "voice-centric" ONP legislation
and replacing it with the six new directives that
tackle convergence head-on. Cable networks
don't exist anymore as a separate regulatory cate-
gory. The distinction between basic and value-ad-
ded services no longer exists. Europe has started
from a clean slate.
One objection to Europe's converged approach
is that it creates an invitation to extend telecom-
style regulation to new digital networks and ser-
vices that weren't regulated in the past, and
shouldn't be regulated in the future-the In-
ternet, for example.
Let's look at this objection more closely, since it
is one of the most frequent criticisms of the Euro-
pean framework, and we're facing the issue right
now in France in connection with VoIP and TV
over ADSL.
First, when we speak of the legacy of regulation
invading the Internet space, what kind of regula-
tion are we talking about?
There are basically two kinds of regulation: ac-
cess and tariff remedies (such as those we de-
scribed above) and other public interest/con-
sumer protection rules.
For access and tariff remedies, the perceived
danger is that the new framework will invite regu-
lators to impose forced access measures on cable
operators, interconnect rules on Internet back-
bone providers, and/or tariff constraints on new
innovative services such as TV over ADSL. The
US is fighting hard at the ITU to avoid undue reg-
ulation of the Internet. France T6lcom is lobby-
ing the French Parliament right now so that "in-
novative" broadband services escape tariff regula-
tion entirely. France Tl6com's argument goes as
follows: when Microsoft comes out with a new
software product, nobody regulates its retail price.
Abuses of market power are dealt with through
competitive law. Why should France T6l6com be
different? Intuitively, France T6l6com's argument
sounds right, except that in many cases the "inno-
vative service" marketed by France T6lcom (TV
over ADSL is a good example) will rely on legacy
infrastructure (the local loop) financed by the
French rate-payer when France T6lcom was still a
monopoly. That's the big difference between
Microsoft and France T6l6com, and the reason
some regulation may be necessary, even for "new"
services. By contrast, emerging services provided
over entirely new facilities would not warrant reg-
ulation. This was recently confirmed by the ERG
in their remedies paper, and is consistent with the
approach in the Triennial Review Order.
Mobile operators in Europe also are worried
that the new regulatory tools in the hands of the
national regulators will lead to more intrusive and
costly regulation of mobile services. The hot issue
right now is whether the charges for call termina-
tion on mobile networks should be regulated,
since in the absence of regulation they tend to be
extremely high.
I'm convinced that the regulators' powers,
though broadened under the new framework,
won't lead to over-regulation, simply because the
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market definition and balancing process puts
such a high burden on regulators to justify
whatever measure they propose to implement.
The new framework gives national regulators a
full toolbox of remedies they can apply to situa-
tions of "market power." These tools include the
ability to regulate interconnection tariffs, includ-
ing tariffs charged by mobile operators to termi-
nate calls on their network, and the ability to reg-
ulate retail tariffs, even for new "innovative" ser-
vices. But unlike the old interconnection direc-
tive, which had "automatic" remedies that applied
whenever an operator's market share exceeded
25%, the new directives do not require that any of
these remedies be used in a given situation. Na-
tional regulators have full discretion to use (or
not to use) the tools. The directive only says that
the tools chosen shall be "based on the nature of the
problem identified, proportionate and justified in the
light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the
[Framework Directive]." Intervention in intercon-
nection pricing must "promote efficiency and sustain-
able competition and maximize consumer benefit."
That's a pretty flexible mandate, and regulators
will in each case have to justify their intervention
based on these criteria, sharing their conclusions
with the Commission and other national regula-
tors. Under the new framework, access and tariff
measures have to be narrowly focused on an ac-
tual-or reasonably likely-market failure.
Consumer protection regulation
The second kind of regulation is public interest
and consumer protection regulation. A good il-
lustration of this problem is occurring with VoIP.
Individual licenses have been abolished (except
in connection with the use of frequencies, rights
of way and numbers). But there will still be gen-
eral license obligations that will apply to certain
classes of operators and service providers. Typi-
cally, voice service providers are bound by quality
of service obligations, privacy obligations, public
safety obligations, law enforcement wiretap regu-
lations, etc.
Under the principle of technological neutrality,
there shouldn't be any distinction in theory be-
tween a traditional circuit-switched voice provider
and a VoIP provider. Yet it would be dispropor-
tionate to apply all the traditional voice regula-
tions to VoIP, an emerging technology that most
users do not consider as their principal phone
line. The directives do not provide a clear answer.
Member States have some freedom to decide what
class of service providers will be subject to tradi-
tional "voice" license obligations. Many hope that
VoIP won't be burdened with this kind of regula-
tion until a substantial part of the population ac-
tually uses VoIP as their principal telephone line.
Both VoIP and mobile may, in the coming dec-
ade, replace traditional voice service provided by
the incumbent. The phenomenon is clear in cen-
tral European countries where a significant num-
ber of consumers are abandoning their tradi-
tional telephone subscription, relying solely on
mobile. As they lose market share, incumbents
will be pushing hard for a level playing field: ei-
ther regulate mobile and VoIP the same way as
traditional voice, or else remove regulatory con-
straints on traditional voice service.
PRICING OF SPECTRUM
Several speakers at this symposium discussed
the FCC's new spectrum policy. On spectrum
management, the United States is definitely
ahead of Europe. The United States is pushing
ahead with "flexibility" in spectrum use, phasing
out the old "command and control" model. Eu-
rope is still generally wedded to the command
and control model. Nevertheless, the new direc-
tives introduce some new concepts.
The new authorization directive makes a dis-
tinction between "administrative charges" and
"fees." Member States can impose administrative
charges on all entities operating under a general
authorization. But administrative charges are
solely destined to cover the costs incurred in man-
agement, control and enforcement of general au-
thorizations and usage rights. The charges are
cost-based. Usage "fees," on the other hand, do
not have to be cost-based. Member States can im-
pose fees on operators seeking access to frequen-
cies, for example. The fees correspond to the
price of the scarce resource, i.e., its economic
value. This price is unrelated to costs.
[Vol. 12





Related to general authorisation Related to Scarce Resources
Cost oriented Set at "economic value"
of resource
Funds collected should be Funds collected can be used for
used for NRA budget any national purpose
(e.g. national health care)
But that does not mean that national govern-
ments are completely free to set the appropriate
price for spectrum. In setting the price for spec-
trum, national governments must comply with the
following principles:
" the fees must reflect the need to ensure opti-
mal use of the frequency resources;
" the fees must be "objectively justified, trans-
parent, non-discriminatory and proportion-
ate in relation to their intended purpose;"t
" in setting the level of fees, Member States
must take into account the "mission state-
ment" principles of Article 8 of the Frame-
work Directive
Would fees set through a pure auction process
comply with these requirements? Fees resulting
from an auction could be justified as encouraging
the optimal use of frequency resources, because
the highest bidder would presumably attach the
highest value to the frequency and make the most
productive use of it. An auction conducted ac-
cording to objective and published rules would
also be transparent and non-discriminatory. More
difficult is the question of whether fees set via an
auction are "proportionate in relation to their in-
tended purpose" when the fees attain multi-bil-
lion dollar levels. The "intended purpose" of fees
is to encourage efficient use of spectrum while
promoting the objectives of the new framework's
''mission statement." Maximizing revenues for the
general government budget, though a nice by-
product of spectrum fees, is not their "intended
purpose." Consequently, a multibillion-dollar fee
could well be considered disproportionate to the
intended purpose of the fees. The directive re-
quires that usage fees for frequency be used as an
I Authorization Directive 2002/20/EC, art. 13, 2002 O.J.
(L 108) 29.
2 Authorization Directive 2002/20/EC, recital 32, 2002
instrument to ensure the optimal use of such re-
sources, and that the level of fees "not hinder the
development of innovative services and competi-
tion in the market. ' 2 Moreover, if a competitive
or comparative selection process leads to a lump-
sum payment, Member States must ensure that
the payment arrangement ensures that the fees
"do not in practice lead to selection on the basis
of criteria unrelated to the objective of ensuring
optimal use of radio frequencies." 3 The Commis-
sion may publish "best practice" benchmarks for
the assignment of radio frequencies. Finally, a
pure auction would not further the objectives of
the new framework's mission statement, which re-
quires national governments to strive for effective
competition, development of the internal market
and interests of users. All this suggests that pure
auctions may not be an acceptable means of set-
ting usage fees under the new Authorization Di-
rective.
These principles apply of course to new 3G li-
censes, but also to the renewal of existing GSM
licenses. Many GSM licenses in Western Europe
will be coming up for renewal in the next few
years, and national governments are already con-
sidering whether to raise GSM spectrum fees so
that they come closer to UMTS/3G levels. GSM
operators are fighting this, and the new directives
provide some good arguments for mobile opera-
tors, notably the fact that spectrum fees must be
"proportionate to their intended purpose." That
requires national governments to define what the
"intended purpose" of spectrum fees is. "Raising
money for the treasury" is not a permissible "in-
tended purpose." Consequently, governments
must justify high fees in some other way that is
permitted under the new framework, which may
not be easy. Some mobile operators are even
wondering whether the Framework Directive
might be used to relax some of the burdensome
license fees already imposed in the context of
UMTS/3G licenses.
SPECTRUM TRADING, LEASING
The new framework does not impose spectrum
trading. The Framework Directive requires that




the assignment of radio frequencies be managed
"as efficiently as possible," and suggests that "the
transfer of radio frequencies can be an effective
means of increasing efficient use of spectrum."
4
The Framework Directive does not require Mem-
ber States to make frequency usage rights trans-
ferable, but says that Member States "may" foresee
that possibility. In many Member States, the use
of frequency is the equivalent of a lease of public
property, and such leases are by nature non-trans-
ferable without special legislative action. Hogan
& Hartson is conducting a study for the European
Commission on the legal aspects of spectrum trad-
ing throughout Europe. For the moment, every-
one is watching closely the work of the FCC,
which has recently authorized spectrum "leasing,"
which permits mobile operators to loan each
other spectrum according to traffic needs.
Another issue important to mobile operators is
whether national governments are able to impose
particular technological norms on mobile opera-
tors in light of the principle of "technological
neutrality." This recently became an issue in
France, where the operator of PAMR services
(mobile radios for professional users) wanted to
abandon the old technology specified in its li-
cense (TETRA) and adopt a CDMA nom, which is
part of the IMT-2000 "3G" family. In other words,
could the PAMR operator become a 3G operator
in disguise? The PAMR operator claimed it
should be allowed to do so under the principle of
"technological neutrality" mentioned in the
Framework Directive. The French authorities dis-
agreed, holding that the operator must stick with
the technology imposed in the license. The con-
sequences of this decision were quite dramatic:
the operator filed for bankruptcy and went into
liquidation, with consequent loss of jobs.
CONCLUSION
Europe has adopted legislation that fully em-
braces the concept of convergence. The fear that
national regulators in Europe will take their new-
found tools to extend legacy regulation to the In-
ternet is misplaced. Regulators have to use their
new tools with surgical precision, and justify their
actions to the Commission and other regulators
each time they apply a remedy. The standard for
defining dominance has also been raised, so that
only operators holding a dominant position as de-
fined under competition law will be subject to
burdensome ex ante regulation. The bigger wor-
ries surrounding the new framework are: (a) that
regulators will get hopelessly bogged down in the
market analysis and balancing processes, leading
to regulatory gridlock, and (b) that each national
regulator will reach a different outcome as a re-
sult of these analyses.
4 Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, recital 19, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 35.
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ANNEX: SUMMARY OF KEY DIRECTIVES
The Framework Directive.
The Framework Directive defines the terms
"electronic communications networks" and "elec-
tronic communications services," and attempts to
draw the line between content (which is not cov-
ered by the new framework) and communications
networks and services (which are covered). The
Framework Directive also sets forth the new defi-
nition of "significant market power" ("SMP").
Under the old ONP directives, the notion of "sig-
nificant market power" was tied to a 25% market
share. This old market share test falls short of the
traditional competition law threshold for "domi-
nant position." The new framework directive
aligns the definition of "SMP" with the competi-
tion law definition of "dominant position" (gener-
ally market share exceeding 40%-50%), thereby
taking a step toward the day when ONP-style (sec-
tor specific) regulation will disappear entirely,
leaving only competition law in its wake.
Under the new definition, an operator has sig-
nificant market power if:
"either individually orjointly with others, it enjoys a po-
sition of economic strength affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of com-
petitors, customers and ultimately consumers."
This definition is taken almost word-for-word
from the applicable case law defining the concept
of "dominant position" under article 81 of the EC
Treaty.
The other controversial issue in the Framework
Directive is the requirement that national regula-
tory authorities inform the Commission and other
national regulators ahead of time of proposed
measures. The Commission insisted on maintain-
ing some kind of control over national decisions,
since under the new framework national regula-
tors will have ADDED FREEDOM and there is conse-
quently a risk of diverging rules emerging
throughout Europe. The new framework is built
on the principles of transparency and benchmark-
ing for national regulatory decisions. National de-
cisions will be circulated among regulators in
other European countries before being finally
adopted, and other regulators, and the Commis-
sion, would have an opportunity to comment.
The Framework Directive also requires that na-
tional regulators consult interested persons
before adopting any measure of import.
Finally, the Framework Directive contains a
"mission statement" of key regulatory principles
that national regulators should keep constantly in
mind when making decisions. These key princi-
ples include:




8(1 ) Cultural and linguistic diversity
Media pluralism
Promote competition
Art. End-user choice, pdce, quality
8(2) No distortion of competition
Encourage infrastructure investment and innovation
Efficient use and effective management of frequencies and numbers
Develop internal market
Remove obstacles to provision of services and networks at a European level
Art. Trans-European networks, interoperabilty of pan-European services
8(3) No discrimination
Cooperate in a transparent manner with Commission and other regulatory
authorities
Promote interests of citizens
Art. Access to universal service
8(4) Protecting consumers vis A yia suppliers, simple and inexpensive dispute
resolution
Personal data and privacy
Transparency of tadffs and conditions of use
Needs of specific social groups
Network integrity and security
Authorisation Directive.
This directive provides that electronic commu-
nication networks and services no longer require
individual licenses. An operator or service pro-
vider will only have to send in a notification stat-
ing that it intends to begin service, and it can start
providing the service immediately.
This light-handed approach to licensing is op-
posite the current practice in a number of coun-
tries, which require relatively heavy license proce-
dures.
Under the new directive, operators would still
have to apply for individual permission to use
spectrum or numbering resources. For granting
spectrum, Member States would have to craft pro-
cedures that give due weight to the "mission state-
ment" in the Framework Directive. This means
that pure auction procedures may be prohibited.
Rights of way will continue to be complex under
the new framework. The directives do little to
harmonize national practices, and local authori-
ties may decide to "fill the void" with burdensome
local requirements.
Access Directive.
The new access and interconnection directive
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maintains the current interconnection obligations
that exist today, but would empower national reg-
ulatory authorities to modify the interconnection
and access obligations over time as a function of
the market and the new definition of "SMP." Na-
tional regulators will have the power to order ac-
cess to any kind of facility or service listed in the
directive, provided that the regulator finds that
"the denial of access ... would hinder the emergence of a
sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or
would not be in the end-user's interest. "I
The national regulator would have power to or-
der access to cable networks or third generation
mobile networks, for example, if doing so was nec-
essary to ensure competition.
Universal Service Directive
This new directive consolidates the various
ONP directives that exist already on universal ser-
vice, leased lines and voice telephony. The direc-
tive contains a sunset clause that would allow na-
tional governments to phase out certain provi-
sions once "effective competition" is achieved,
and contains new rights for end-users, including a
right to out-of-court dispute resolution proce-
dures. Importantly, the Universal Service and
Users' Rights directive also describes how regula-
tors are supposed to control retail tariffs, both to
protect consumers, but also to protect competi-
tion (against instances of price squeeze for exam-
ple).
Communications Data Protection Directive
This directive updates the 1997 telecommunica-
tions data protection directive to ensure that In-
ternet-related data are also covered by privacy
provisions. The directive introduces an "opt-in"
I Access Directive 2002/19/EC, art. 12, 2002 OJ. (LI
regime for unsolicited e-mail ("spain"), as well as
an opt-in regime for the use of location data on
mobile networks (data that indicates exactly
where you are at a given time). The directive re-
quires that operators erase or render anonymous
personal data (including logs of Internet use) as
soon as they are no longer required for billing
purposes. Applied literally, this means that ISPs
that bill customers on a flat-rate basis would have
to erase logs immediately after the connection.
But the directive's rules are "without prejudice" to
national provisions on law enforcement and na-
tional security. As a practical matter, therefore,
national data retention rules designed to assist law
enforcement will continue to apply, and may vary
considerably from one European country to the
next.
"Competition" Directive
The competition directive consolidates the ex-
isting "Services Directive," and restates some of
the principles that exist under the Framework Di-
rective (access to rights of way, independent na-
tional regulatory authorities, universal service).
Why restate principles that have been explained
in other directives? The reason is that the princi-
ples flow also from competition law. The two pil-
lars of European telecom legislation are competi-
tion law (from which the 1990 Services Directive
was born) and the ONP rules (that arise out of
"sector-specific" rules). The Commission's "com-
petition" directive is there to remind us that if a
Member State does not implement one of the ba-
sic principles of the Framework Directive, that
Member State (and the national operator) may be
violating the competition rules set forth in the EC
Treaty.
08)15.
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